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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-1466 
 ___________ 
 
 JAMIE OREA-HERNANDEZ, 




 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 




 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A099-941-422) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Rosalind K. Malloy 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 24, 2011 
 Before:  FUENTES, VANASKIE AND ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 







 Orea-Hernandez petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ 
(“BIA”) order upholding the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision concluding that Orea-
Hernandez is not a United States citizen and directing his removal to Mexico.  For the 
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reasons that follow, we will deny the petition for review. 
I 
 During the course of a workplace raid in 2007, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (“ICE”) officers interviewed Orea-Hernandez.  In response to the officers’ 
questions, Orea-Hernandez identified his mother as Juliana Hernandez, and stated that 
she and his father were Mexican nationals.  AR 130-31.  Orea-Hernandez’s aunt, with 
whom he lived, came down to the workplace and spoke with the ICE officers; she 
informed the officers that Orea-Hernandez’s father was Sotero Orea.  Id.  Based on the 
information obtained from the interview, the ICE officers concluded that Orea-Hernandez 
entered the United States without inspection and was therefore removable.  The 
Department of Homeland Security issued Orea-Hernandez a notice to appear. 
 In 2009, Orea-Hernandez appeared before the IJ.  At the hearing, he testified that 
he was born in Mexico, and that his maternal grandmother brought him to the United 
States when he was two years old.  AR 124, 134.  Orea-Hernandez’s grandmother raised 
him in the United States.  Orea-Hernandez explained that, at some point during his 
childhood, his grandmother taught him his parents’ names, and that his father died before 
he was born.  AR 126, 128.  After leaving Mexico as a child, he met his mother only 
twice:  when she moved to the United States and settled nearby for a two-year period 
when he was a child, and again when she returned briefly in 2004.  AR 132-33, 138.   
 The IJ denied relief, reasoning that the Government established that Orea-
Hernandez is a citizen of Mexico by introducing his Mexican passport, and that Orea-
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Hernandez failed to qualify for derivative citizenship under the “foundling statute,” 8 
U.S.C. § 1401(f), because, inter alia, he failed to show that he was a person of “unknown 
parentage.”  The BIA dismissed his appeal, agreeing with the IJ’s “unknown parentage” 
analysis.  Orea-Hernandez timely petitioned for review of that order. 
II 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).  Because the BIA issued its 
own opinion, we review its decision rather than that of the IJ.  See Li v. Att’y Gen., 400 
F.3d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 2005).  However, we also look to the decision of the IJ to the 
extent that the BIA deferred to or adopted the IJ’s reasoning.  See Chavarria v. Gonzalez, 
446 F.3d 508, 515 (3d Cir. 2006).   
 Orea-Hernandez’s petition for review presents two main questions:  (1) whether 
the Agency correctly allocated the burdens for demonstrating his removability and 
entitlement to relief, and (2) whether the BIA erred in concluding that he is not a United 
States citizen.  As to the first question, it is well-settled that the government bore the 
initial burden of proving Orea-Hernandez’s removability “by clear, unequivocal and 
convincing evidence.”  Sewak v. INS, 900 F.2d 667, 670 n.7 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing 
Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966)).  Once the Government presented evidence 
demonstrating that Orea-Hernandez was born outside the United States and had entered 
without inspection,1
                                                 
1  Here, the Government’s burden was satisfied by the admission into evidence of 
Orea-Hernandez’s Mexican passport, which indicated that he was born in Mexico, 
 “the legislative scheme require[d Orea-Hernandez] to justify his 
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presence in the United States.”  Vlisidis v. Holland, 245 F.2d 812, 814 (3d Cir. 1957) 
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1361).  As the BIA correctly stated, Orea-Hernandez then bore the 
burden of proving his citizenship by a preponderance of the evidence.  See Delmore v. 
Brownell, 236 F.2d 598, 600 (3d Cir. 1956). 
 Next, we turn to the question whether the Agency correctly concluded that Orea-
Hernandez was not a “person of unknown parentage” within the meaning of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”).  Whether the Agency correctly interpreted that 
provision of the INA is a question of law over which we exercise de novo review, subject 
to appropriate deference.2
                                                                                                                                                             
and his testimony admitting that he came into the country without inspection. 
 
2  We note that what constitutes “appropriate” deference to an unpublished, non-
precedential BIA decision issued by a single Board member remains an open 
question.  See De Leon-Ochoa v. Att’y Gen., 622 F.3d 341, 350-51 (3d Cir. 2010).  
Here, as in De Leon-Ochoa, because the issue of appropriate deference is not 
dispositive, we decline to resolve that question.  See id. at 351. 
 
  See De Leon-Ochoa v. Att’y Gen., 622 F.3d 341, 348 (3d Cir. 
2010).  An individual is presumed to be a national and citizen of the United States at birth 
if he is a “person of unknown parentage found in the United States while under the age of 
five years, until shown, prior to his attaining the age of twenty-one years, not to have 
been born in the United States.”  8 U.S.C. § 1401(f).  Orea-Hernandez argued that he is a 
person of unknown parentage because he never knew his father, who died before he was 
born, and was estranged from his mother.  The IJ reasoned, and the BIA agreed, that 
Orea-Hernandez knew who his parents were and maintained close ties with his mother’s 
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family; his lack of a close relationship with his biological parents did not render him a 
“person of unknown parentage” within the meaning of the INA.   
 In assessing the BIA’s interpretation of that term, we apply the familiar two-step 
inquiry under Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984): 
If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; 
for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.  If, however, 
the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the 
precise question at issue . . . the question for the court is 
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute. 
 
Id. at 842-43.  When interpreting a statute, “we begin by analyzing the statutory 
language, assuming that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the 
legislative purpose.”  Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 2149, 2156 
(2010) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  According to the Oxford English 
Dictionary, something “unknown” is “[n]ot known; strange, unfamiliar.”  OED Online 
(2011), available at http://www.oed.com.  And “parentage” is “the condition or status of a 
parent; parenthood,” or “[t]he identity of one’s parents, now esp. as regards nationality or 
ethnicity; descent, lineage.”  Id.; see also Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009) 
(“parentage” is the “state or condition of being a parent; kindred in the direct ascending 
line”).  In short, § 1401(f) confers citizenship upon those who, inter alia, do not know 
who their parents are.  The plain language of the statute compels us to reject the argument 
that § 1401(f) also includes those, like Orea-Hernandez, who know their parents’ 
identities, but do not know their parents well because they have been raised by members 
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of their extended family.  Thus, the BIA correctly concluded that Orea-Hernandez could 
not sustain his burden of proving his derivative citizenship. 
 Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review. 
